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SEARCH OF AUTOMOBILE AFTER ARREST
FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
The extent to which a police officer may search an automobile has
always posed a difficult problem in the law of search and seizure
since an automobile and any evidence it contains may be easily moved
out of the grasp of law officers.1 Since 1961 and the extension of
the federal exclusionary rule to all state criminal prosecutions, 2 this
problem has become more acute. States which have not had to face
the problem must now establish standards by which it may be deter-
mined whether a search is proper.3 In developing these standards, two
1"We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show
that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government,
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). A warrant is not necessary when
it is impractical, but if "the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it
must be used ... " Id. at 156. Where the car is in the custody of the police and the
defendant no longer has access to it, a warrant should be required, because the car
can no longer be moved from the jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 3o9
Ky. 276, 217 S.W.2d 625 (1949); People v. Carr, 370 Mich. 251, 121 N.W.2d 449
(1963); Contra, People v. Baker, 135 Cal. App. 2d 1, 286 P.2d 51o (Dist. Ct. App.
1955). In this case, the defendant was in jail on charges of drunk driving, and the
car was in a garage. The officer returned to the garage, searched the car, and
found a gun. The conviction for possession of firearms was affirmed on the grounds
that since the car was in the legal possession of the police, the gun was also.
2The exclusionary rule was first established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). This decision barred the use of evidence in a federal prosecution if it
was secured through an illegal search. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
the Court held that, although the Fourth Amtndment right to be protected from
illegal search and seizure was applicable to states, the Fourteenth Amendment did
not prohibit the use of illegally obtained evidence in a state criminal proceeding.
The question in Wolf was again presented to the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1q61). In this case, the Court held that evidence obtained by an illegal search
was not admissible. Wolf was overruled so far as it was inconsistent with this
decision. "Having once recognized the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against
rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we
can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise." Id. at 660. The first
case after Mapp was Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). It indicated that there
could be instances where evidence that would be excluded from federal prosecutions
would be admissible in state actions, but neither Ker nor the most recent case of
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 1O8 (1964), involved such a situation. This point has still
not been fully developed by the Court.
3At the time of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), about one half of the states
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basic questions must be answered: (i) When is a search proper? (2)
What areas of the car may be searched?
In the recent decision of Lane v. Commonwealth,4 the defendant
was arrested by a state trooper for improper passing. It then de-
veloped that he did not have a driver's license. After the arrest, the
trooper searched the defendant and placed him in the police car.
While waiting for a wrecker to tow the defendant's car away, ap-
parently because the defendant could not legally drive it, the police
officer returned to defendant's car, searched it, and found seven
cases of whiskey in the trunk. The defendant was indicted for the
offense of transporting alcoholic beverages for the purpose of sale in
a dry territory. At the trial, the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained as a result of the search was overruled, and he was
convicted. On appeal, the court held that the search was illegal, and
the conviction was reversed. The court stated:
"It is our opinion that when a person is arrested for a traffiic
violation or other minor violation the mere fact of the arrest
does not give to the officer absolute right to search the vehicles
or premises indiscriminately. It would be impossible to lay
down a rule which would apply to all conditions and all states
of facts and this opinion should not be construed to mean that
a person in custody may not be searched in order to be dis-
armed, or to prevent escape or the immediate destruction of evi-
dence for which he was detained." 5
Lane adopts the rule which is generally followed in other juris-
dictions6 that a search is not permitted merely because there has been
an arrest, but it does permit an investigatory search if the arresting
officer believes:
(i) that the defendant is armed or might attempt to escape; or
(2) that the defendant may destroy evidence which is the fruit or
implement of the crime for which he was arrested.
Neither of these circumstances appreciably increases the authority
had adopted the exclusionary rule. They were: California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming. See appendix to Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 2o6, 224
(196o); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 n.i (McNaughton ed. i96i).
4S86 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1964).
rId. at 745.
6E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); People v. Mickelson, 59
Cal. 2d 448, 38o P.2d 658, 3o Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963); Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla.
Crim. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); People v. Thomas, 31 Ill. 2d 212, 201 N.E.2d 413
(1964)-
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of an officer in conducting a search after an arrest for a traffic viola-
tion.
7
7Since use of a search warrant is not always practical when automobiles are
involved, most searchs must be conducted without a warrant. A search without
a warrant is permitted if it is incident to a valid arrest. "[A] search without a war-
rant incident to an arrest is dependent initially on a valid arrest." United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 6o (195o). Ortiz v. United States, 317 F.2d 277 (5 th Cir.
1963); Mardis v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 70, 32 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); People v. Carr, 370 Mich. 251, 121 N.W.2d 449 (1963); South Euclid v.
Palladino, 93 Ohio L. Abs. 24, 193 N.E.2d 56o (Munic. Ct. 1963); McCormick v. State,
277 P.2d 219 (Okla. Grim. App. 1954).
Under the law of arrest, an arrest for a misdemeanor is proper only if the mis-
demeanor is committed in the presence of a police officer. Adair v. Williams, 24
Ariz. 422, 210 Pac. 853 (1922); Orick v. State, 140 Miss. 184, 105 So. 465 (1925);
Shirey v. State, 321 P.2d 981 (Okla. Grim. App. 1958); State v. Reichman, 135 Tenn.
653, 188 S.W. 225 (1916); 4 Wharton, Criminal Law & Procedure § 1597, at 247
(Anderson ed. 1957); Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, 19 (1947).
Reasonable belief is sufficient to arrest for the commission of a felony, Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 Pac. 799
(1894); Robinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 18 S.E. 1oi8 (1893); Grace v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521,
209 SAV. 369 (1919); Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242 (1924); 4
Wharton, Criminal Law & Procedure § 1596 at 243 (Anderson ed. 1957), but is not
sufficient grounds to arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor. People v. Shapiro,
213 Cal. App. 2d 618, 28 Cal. Rptr. 907 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State v. Mobley, 240
N.G. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 (1954); Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 299, 262 P.2d 464
(1953). The federal courts have adopted a different view when dealing with motor
vehicles. An arrest is permitted when there is probable cause even though it is not
a felony. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16o (1949); Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
It does not seem necessary to place the defendant under formal arrest before
the search is made. It is necessary, however, that valid grounds for an arrest exists at
the time of the search. People v. Gibson, 220 Cal. App. 2d 15, 33 Cal. Rptr. 775
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State v. Christensen, 151 Ore. 529, 51 P.2d 835 (1935). The
federal rule holds that once the car is stopped, the arrest has been made though no
formal statement to that effect is made. "When the officers interrupted the two
men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case,
was complete." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, L03 (1959). Accord, Robertson
v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947). But see People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.
2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. iS (1963), where the California court holds that
the state can authorize officers to stop motorists for temporary investigatory deten-
tion though there is no reasonable cause to arrest the occupant. Since the rule in
Henry v. United States was not determined on constitutional grounds, the court
feels that temporary detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment as applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
"[I]t is generally held that the stopping of a motorist for investigation does
not constitute an arrest since there is no 'taking into custody' and no purpose other
than to check on the driver's license or to otherwise investigate him or the car. And
the issuance of a traffic citation, a court summons, or subpoena is not an arrest, for
here, too, there is no 'taking into custody.'" Inbau & Sowle, Cases on Criminal Jus-
tice, 513 (196o). Although there is no taking into custody, statutes authorizing the
issuance of summons are phrased so that it appears the defendant is arrested and
the only purpose of the summons is to release him from custody.
"Arrest for misdemeanor, release on summons and promise to appear; admitting
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There are two extreme situations which mark the boundaries of
the problem of searching an automobile after arrest for a minor traffic
violation. Neither of these situations presents any difficulty. At one
extreme is the situation in which the defendant has simply been
stopped for a traffic violation, and there are no additional facts. In
this case, the officer may only arrest the defendant and take him into
custody or issue a summons. A search is not warranted and there is
no right to conduct one, simply because there has been an arrest for
a traffic violation.8 This is the basic and most fundamental rule in
this area of search and seizure law. At the other extreme, is the situa-
tion where the police officer through the exercise of his senses: 9 sees,' 0
hears,11 or smells'2 something which gives him personal knowledge
to bail; violations. (a) Whenever any person is arrested for a violation of any pro-
vision of this title punishable as a misdemeanor the arresting officer shall, except
as otherwise provided in § 46.1-179, take the name and address of such person and
the license number of his motor vehicles and issue a summons or otherwise notify
him in writing to appear at a time and place to be specified in such summons or
notice, such time to be at least five days after such arrest unless the person arrested
shall demand an earlier hearing, and such person shall, if he so desires, have a right
to an immediate hearing or a hearing within twenty-four hours at a convenient
hour, and before a court having jurisdiction under this title within the city, town or
county wherein such offense was committed. Such officer shall thereupon and upon
the giving by such person of his written promise to appear at such time and place
forthwith release him from custody." Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-178 (Repl. Vol. 1958).
Accord Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 281.765 (1963); Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1019 (1955);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 30.56 (s96i), § 321.05 (1957)-
On arrest, see generally Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201 (1940);
Note, 21 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 249 (1964).
s"[T]he the mere fact of arrest does not give to the officer absolute right to
search the vehicle or premises indiscriminately." Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d
743, 745 (Ky. 1964). Accord, People v. Thomas, 31 Ill. 2d 212, 2o N.E.2d 413 (1964);
People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 1oo N.W.2d 456 (196o); Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla.
Crim. 299, 292 P.2d 464 (1953); Elliot v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d oo9 (1938).
Professor Agata of Montana State University takes exception to the point that
absent additional circumstances the fact of arrest for a minor traffic violation will
never allow an incidental search. See Agata, Searches & Seizures Incident to Traffic
Violations-A Reply to Professor Simeone, 7 St. Louis U.LJ. 1 (962).
"Trooper Righter was entitled to observe by 'exercise of his own senses' what-
ever thereby was disclosed." People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269,
273 (1963); Park v. United States, 294 Fed. 776 (1st Cir. 1924); Elrod v. Moss, 278
Fed. 123 (4th Cir. 1921); United States v. Rembert, 284 Fed. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1922).
Strictly speaking, evidence obtained through the exercise of one's senses is not a
search.
'United States v. Haley, 321 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1963); People v. Martin, 140
Cal. App. 2d 387, 295 P.2d 33 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Morgan v. Town of Heidel-
berg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963).
"Pack v. United States, 294 Fed. 776 (1st Cir. 1924); Shafer v. State, 151 Tex.
Crim. 558, 209 S.W.2d 599 (1948); Manriques v. State, 291 SA.. 231 (Tex. Crim. App.
1926).
"Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9 th Cir. 1963); Mardis v. Superior
Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 70, 32 Cal. Repr. 263 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People v. Baker,
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that a crime other than the traffic offense is being committed. This
knowledge gives the police officer probable cause, which allows a
search of the car without a warrant. 3 Thus, if a person is stopped
for speeding and the officer sees illegal alcohol in the back seat, the
car may be searched, the liquor seized, and all evidence obtained as a
result of the search and seizure may be used at trial.'4
Although these two extremes do not present any real problem,
the area in between does. The first exception to the rule that there is
no right to make a search just because there has been an arrest arises
when the police officer believes that the defendant is armed or might
attempt to escape. Then he may search the car, but only for the pur-
pose of disarming the defendant or preventing his escape. Generally,
135 Cal. App. 2d 1, 286 P.2d 51o (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Bagwell v. State, 327 P.2d
479 (Okla. 1958).
13A vehicle on the highway may be searched without a warrant when probable
cause for the search exists. "The right to search and the validity of the seizure
are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable
cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend
against the law." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925). Thus, while a
search without a warrant may be made even when the search is not an incident of
an arrest, the standard is the same as would be required to obtain a warrant. There
must be probable cause. "Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known
to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been com-
mitted." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). "Carroll v. United States ...
liberalized the rule governing searches when a moving vehicle is involved. But that
decision merely relaxed the requirement for a warrant on the grounds of practi-
cality. It did not dispense with the need for probable cause." Id. at 104.
'4"[T]he legally discovered whiskey opened the gate for a quest otherwise
barred." Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Grim. 299, 262 P.2d 464, 480 (1953). After the ini-
tial arrest for a minor violation, an officer may determine that the driver is intox-
icated. E.g., Mardis v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 70, 32 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963); State v. Halko, 188 A.2d 1oo (Super. Ct. Del. 1962); State v. Giles,
254 N.C. 499, 119 S.E.-d 394 (96). The officer may see alcohol, as in United States
v. Haley, 321 F.-d 956 (6th Cir. 1963); Koscielski v. State, 199 Ind. 546, 158 N.E.
902 (1927); Berry v. State, 197 Ind. 212, 15o N.E. 315 (1926); People v. Kuntze,
371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.-d 269 (1963); State v. Christensen, 151 Ore. 529, 51 P.2d 835
(1935); State v. Taft, 11o S.E.2d 727 (AV. Va. 1959); or other contraband in the car,
as in People v. Martin, 140 Cal. App. 2d 387, 295 P.2d 33 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (green
botanical substance which looked like marijuana); People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419,
124 N.W.2d 269 (1963) (leg of deer protruding from under the seat); Morgan v. Town
of Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963) (weapon partially concealed under
driver's leg). The arresting officer may see the driver attempt to hide something.
People v. One 1958 Chevrolet Impala, 219 Cal. App. 2d 18, 33 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); People v. Shapiro, 213 Cal. App. 2d 618, 28 Cal. Rptr. 907 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956). While making a
limited investigatory search incident to the initial arrest, evidence of another crime
may be found. People v. Witt, 159 Cal. App. 2d 492, 324 P.-d 79 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958); People v. Thomas, 31 IIl. 2d 212, 201 N.E..d 413 (1964); Brinegar v. State, 97
Okla. Grim. 299, 262 P.-d 464 (1953); Duncan v. States, 191 Tenn. 427, 234 S.W.2d
835 (1950); State v. Olsen, 43 Wash. ad 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953).
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a search for this purpose may be conducted when the situation con-
fronting the officer reasonably indicates that the defendant might be
armed.15 If the person arrested is recognized as a wanted criminal,'(
or if the police have been informed that the defendant was armed,1
7
the officer would be justified in searching the car for weapons. A search
for weapons has also been allowed where the defendant was a per-
sistent law violator,'8 or where he is known to have been convicted
previously and to be a dangerous person.' 9 Although the facts of each
case will determine whether there may be a search, there must be an
additional factor which would put a reasonable person on notice that
the defendant is armed and constitutes a threat to the safety of the
officer.20 In developing this rule, the courts must not only guarantee
the saftey of the police, but must also protect the public by prevent-
ing this rule from becoming a subterfuge for allowing unjustified
searches.
2 '
The second question presented is what areas of the car may be
""When, however, the circumstances reasonably indicate that the police may be
dealing not with the ordinary traffic violator but with a criminal, then a search of
the driver and his vehicle is authorized in order to insure the safety of the police
officers and to prevent an escape of the might-be criminal." People v. Thomas, 31
Ill. 2d 212, 2o N.E.2d 413, 414 (1964). "It is insisted that before the right to search
for firearms accrued to the officers they must have reasonable ground for such
action. With this we agree." Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 299, 262 P.2d 464,
480 (1953); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 488, 38o P. 2d 658, 3o Cal. Rptr. s8 (1963);
People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 (1959); Duncan v. State, 191 Tenn.
427, 234 S-.2d 835 (1950).
"People v. Cantley, 163 Cal. App. 2d 762, 229 P.2d 993 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
(defendant fitted description of murder suspect); People v. Witt, 159 Cal. App.
2d 492, 324 P.2d 79 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (recognized defendant as a known drug
addict, thief, and suspected burgular).
2'People v. Jiminez, 143 Cal. App. 2d 671, 3oo P.2d 68 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956);
State v. Hoover, 219 Ore. 288, 347 P.2d 69 (1959).
"8Edwards v. State, 319 P.2d 1021 (Okla. Grim. App. 1957).
"Duncan v. State, 191 Tenn. 427, 234 S.V.2d 835 (195o).
'OIt is clear that where the officer knew the defendant and knew he was not
dangerous there were no grounds for a search. Stevens v. State, 274 P.2d 402 (Okla.
Grim. App. 1954); Mervin v. State, 277 P.2d 208 (Okla. Grim. App. 1954). The prob-
lem with this limitation is one of proof. The defendant will have a difficult time
showing that the officer only suspected trouble and did not have reasonable belief
to fear that the defendant was armed.
"'An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence." United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 'U.S. 452, 467 (1932); Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953);
Brown v. Satte, 62 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1952); Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198
S.W.2d 633 (1947); Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344, 181 S.W.2d 338 (1944).
If any traffic violation would permit a search no one would be safe because
"traffic regulations as a whole are so complicated now in cities and towns and even
out on highways that it requires a very alert person indeed to escape violating some
of the rules and regulations at some time." Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Grim. 299,
262 P.2d 464, 474 (1953).
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searched in order to find weapons and thereby prevent an escape. The
general rule is that the areas which are readily accessible to the de-
fendant may be searched.2 2 Since the purpose of the search is solely for
the protection of the officers, there should not be a search of areas
which are inaccessible to the defendant. This would preclude searching
the trunk,2 3 under the back seat, or under the hood. It would prob-
ably preclude searching a locked glove compartment, 24 since it would
seem improbable that a person could unlock a glove compartment and
pull out a weapon while the officer is beside him. If the defendant gets
out of his car or is taken to the police car, there does not appear to be
any reason for allowing a search of the car for weapons, since there
is not any area of the car that is readily accessible to him.
The first exception to the rule that there is not an absolute right
to search an automobile after an arrest does not widen the scope of
permissible searches very much. It will be the unusual case when a
police officer can search because he believes that the defendant might
be armed. Ordinarily, there would not be reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the defendant is armed, and even if there are sufficient
grounds, the area which may be searched is limited to those readily
accessible to the defendant.
The second exception to the basic rule that a search cannot be
made, simply because there is an arrest, allows a search if the officer
believes that the defendant may destroy evidence, which is itself the
fruit or an implement of the crime for which he was arrested. This
situation will seldom give an officer the right to search, because it is
apparent that few traffic violations will involve fruits or implements
of the crime.23 When a person is arrested for speeding, there will not
nPreston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.
2d 448, 38o P.2d 658, 3o Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963); Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Grim.
299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953).
1Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla.. Grim. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); Elliot v. State,
173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d xoo9 (1938).
nSee Simeone, Search & Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations, 6 St.
Louis U.L.J. 506, 518 (1960); 43 Ky. L.J. 163, 165 (1955).
-In such situations these would be no grounds for a search. People v. Moray,
222 Cal. App. 2d 743, 35 Cal. Rptr. 432 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (did not stop at
stop sign, made illegal left turn); Burley v. State, 59 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1952) (passing
on a curve); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d x, 166 N.E.2d 433 (196o) (parking too
close to cross walk); People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, loo N.W.2d 456 (196o) (failing
to stop for stop sign); People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 (1959) (only
one head light burning).
Generally, the police may stop a car and require the driver to show his license.
This must be done in good faith and not used as an excuse to avoid restriction
against search and seizure. Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 15o So.
2d 512 (1963); Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947); see also
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be any evidence in the vehicle which the defendant must be prevented
from destroying, since the only evidence will be the direct testimony of
the arresting officer.2 6 In fact, nearly all minor traffic violations will
be of this type; therefore, there is almost no situation which would
allow a search of the car in order to find evidence.
2 7 The only obvious
example of a traffic violation where there could be evidence in the
car is an arrest for drunken driving, whereby the officers would be
entitled to search the vehicle.
28
In the rare case where evidence could be found in the car, the
courts have allowed the search to be extended for the purpose of pre-
venting the destruction of evidence which is the fruit or implement of
the crime for which the defendant is arrested; the purpose is not to
find such evidence. It would seem this purpose could be accomplished
by limiting the search to those areas easily accessible to the defend-
ant.20 Thus, the extent of the search would be limited to that allowed
when the search is to disarm the defendant. The courts, however, have
uniformly rejected limiting the search and have allowed the police
to search the entire car including the trunk.30 The damaging effect
of the courts' ruling is limited, however, since few traffic violations
would involve the presence of additional evidence.
Even in a search permitted in order to disarm and prevent escape
or to prevent destruction of evidence an additional limitation is im-
posed. Such a search is reasonable only if it is incident to a valid arrest,
Annot., 154 A.L.R. 812 (1945), on the Effect of Ulterior Motive in Exercising Author-
ity to Require Motorists to Exhibit Driver's License.
As to use of road blocks as a means of searching a car, see 46 Iowa L. Rev. 802
(1961).
""[T]here could ordinarily be no evidence contained in the motor vehicle
which could afford proof that the motorist ran a red light, or speeded." Stevens v.
State, 274 P.2d 402, 407 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
2The defendant can always consent to the search and thereby waive his rights.
To waive his rights the defendant must be cognizant of them and the consent must
be voluntary. The defendant cannot be said to have voluntarily consented if he
does it under strong pressure and coercion from the police. See 4 Wharton, Criminal
Law and Procedure § 1578 at 214 (Anderson ed. 1957). For an interesting situation
involving question of whether the consent was, in fact, freely given, see Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946). Mr. Justice Frankfurter severely attacks the
majority's finding that the waiver was voluntary. Id. at 594.
29Mardis v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 70, 32 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); People v. Baker, 135 Cal. App. 2d 1, 286 (P.2d 510 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955);
Stevens v. State, 274 P.2d 402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
-4Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserts this view and would limit the search for
evidence to what is necessary to prevent destruction of the evidence. See Frank-
furter's dissents in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 58 (1950).
znSee supra note 28; 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 347, 354.
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and it is incident to an arrest only if the time and place of the search
are closely related to the arrest.31 In Preston v. United States,32 a
search to find evidence of the crime was held to be invalid because the
defendant was in jail and the car was in police custody. The Court
stated:
"The search of the car was not undertaken until petitioner and
his companions had been arrested and taken in custody to the
police station and the car had been towed to the garage. At this
point there was no danger that any of the men arrested could
have used any weapons in the car or could have destroyed any
evidence of a crime-assuming that there are articles which can
be 'fruits' or 'implements' of the crime of vagrancy.... Nor,
since the men were under arrest at the police station and the
car was in police custody at a garage, was there any danger
that the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdic-
tion.... We think that the search was too remote in time or
place to have been made incidental to the arrest and conclude,
therefore, that the search of the car without warrant failed to
meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,
rendering the evidence obtained as a result of the search inad-
missible." 33
It appears, therefore, that a search which otherwise would have been
valid may be held improper if it is not incident to the arrest.
A search of a vehicle after an arrest for a traffic violation is nar-
rowly limited. In order to be able to conduct any search, the officer
must have had grounds for believing that the defendant was armed
and might attempt to escape, or that there was evidence of the crime
which the defendant might destroy. Any search which is allowed in
order to disarm the defendant must be limited to the areas easily ac-
cessible to him. There is no such limitation if the search is to prevent
destruction of evidence, but there are almost no situations where there
could be any evidence in the car. Those searches which are permitted
are further limited by the fact that they must be made as an incident
of the arrest and not at some remote time or place. While the language
used in Lane v. Commonwealth might seem rather liberal in its ap-
"A search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is not unreasonable and does
not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
A search can be incident to an arrest only if it is approximately contemporaneous
with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
""376 U.S. 364 (1964).
Id. at 368. The rule of Preston v. United States was applied in People v.
Erickson, 31 111. 2d 23o, 2o N.E.2d 422 (1964) and People v. Catavdella, 31 Ill. 2d
382, 202 N.E.2d 1 (1964).
